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ABSTRACT
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Solution concepts which implement only monotonic social choice rules are 
characterized in terms of a new notion of monotonicity pertaining to solution 
concepts. For any given class G of mechanisms, it turns out that a solution concept a  
implements only monotonic social choice rules via mechanisms in G if and only if a  
is G-monotonic. Moreover, with each solution concept a, we associate a class G^ of 
mechanisms such that each a-implementable onto social choice function which takes 
on at least three different values is dictatorial if and only if a  is Go-monotonic.
Oligarchic social choice rules are characterized by the conjunction of 
unanimity and a monotonicity condition, oligarchic monotonicity, which is stronger 
than Maskin monotonicity. Given an oligarchic social choice rule, the coalition 
acting as the oligarchy turns out to be the minimal set T of agents such that the social 
choice mle is Maskin monotonic when the restriction of each profile to T is 
considered. Finally, the solution concepts which implement only oligarchic social 
choice rules are characterized in terms of oligarchic monotonicity modified for 
solution concepts.
Keywords: Social Choice, Implementation, Monotonicity, Dictatoriality, Oligarchy.
Ill
ÖZET
SOSYAL SEÇİM TEORİSİ HAKKINDA İKİ MAKALE 
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Temmuz 2000
Yalnızca monoton sosyal seçim kurallarını uygulayabilen çözüm kavramları, 
yeni bir monotonluk kavramıyla karakterize edilmiştir. Herhangi bir mekanizmalar 
sınıfı, G, verildiğinde, bir çözüm kavramı a, G içindeki mekanizmalar arcılığıyla 
yalnızca monoton sosyal seçim kurallarını uygulayabilir ancak ve ancak o G- 
monoton ise. Ayrıca, her çözüm kavramı a  için öyle bir mekanizmalar sınıfı Go 
belirlenebilir ki bu sınıf içindeki mekanizmalarla uygulanabilen ve en az üç elemanlı 
bir değer bölgesi olan tüm örten sosyal seçim fonksiyonları diktatörlüktür ancak ve 
ancak a Go-monoton ise.
Oligarşik sosyal seçim kurallarıö oybirliklilik ile yeni bir monotonluk 
kavramı, oligarşi monotonluğunun kesişimi olarak karakterize edilmiştir. Oligarşik 
bir sosyal seçim kuralı verildiğinde, oligarşi pozisyonunda bulunan koalisyonun, her 
tercih profilinin bu koalisyona kısıtlamasına bakıldığında, söz konusu sosyal seçim 
kuralını Maskin cinsinden monoton yapan minimal koalisyon olduğu anlaşılmıştır. 
Son olarak, yalnızca oligarşik sosyal seçim kurallarını uygulayabilen çözüm 
kavramları, oligarşi monotonluğunun çözüm kavramlarına uyarlanmış hali 
aracılığıyla karakterize edilmiştir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Sosyal Seçim, Uygulama, Monotonluk, Diktatörlük, Oligarşi.
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1 Introduction
When a choice is to be made among alternatives over which the members of a 
given society have varying preferences, the question of how to reconcile these 
different preferences arises. Social choice rules (SCR) are the tools to achieve 
this. One may encounter two important problems in this context. One of these 
may arise in the process of choosing the SCR to implement and the other may 
arise when implementing the chosen SCR.
There are some properties that an SCR may possess which are generally ac­
cepted as desirable. One such property is anonimity of the SCR; it may be 
desirable that an SCR treats individuals equally. In particular, an SCR which 
leads to concentration of power in the hands of a single individual or a group 
of individuals - leaving others with no decision power at all - may be deemed 
undesirable. On the other hand, monotonicity of an SCR - which roughly means 
that an alternative chosen by the SCR for a particular society should be chosen 
also for every society where this alternative is ranked higher in everybody’s pref­
erences - may be considered as a desirable property. One problem that might 
arise is that some desirable properties of an SCR may be inconsistent with each 
other. Indeed, it has been shown by Müller and Satterthwaite (1977 ) that onto 
SCRs choosing a single outcome from the alternative set for every society cannot 
be both monotonie and non-dictatorial.
Once an SCR is agreed upon - possibly sacrificing some desirable properties for 
the sake of others - the problem of implementing this rule arises. In many cases.
an SCR allows room for strategic and profitable misrepresentation of preferences 
by the members of a given society. In such cases an indirect mechanism may be 
used instead of directly implementing the said SCR. Each such mechanism, when 
coupled with the preferences of the members of society, leads to a game which 
will be resolved according to a game theoretic solution concept representing the 
mode of behaviour in the society.
In the first part of this thesis we characterize solution concepts that imple­
ment only monotonie social choice rules. In the context of what has been said 
above, what we accomplish is to characterize those societies - represented by so­
lution concepts as their modes of behavior - where no non-monotonic - hence no 
non-dictatorial SCR can be implemented. Such societies are possibly rare. One 
would expect that an SCR should be able to implement both monotonie and 
non-monotonic SCRs depending on the mechanism used. This, in fact, is true for 
many well-known solution concepts for normal form games such as the iterated 
elimination of strictly dominated strategies, undominated strategies, maximin 
strategies, etc. Another thing we do in the first essay below is to point out a 
class of mechanisms for every solution concept via which it can implement only 
monotonie SCRs.
The question of characterizing solution concepts that implement only dictato- 
rialities has been taken up and resolved in Jackson and Srivastava (1996). Given 
the equivalence of monotonicity and dictatoriality for singleton-valued SCRs, the 
question we answer in the first part below is very similar to their problem. What 
Jackson and Srivastava propose as a characterizing condition (direct breaking) 
is concerned with what causes a joint strategy to cease to be an equilibrium as
a result of a change in the profile. Their characterization implies roughly that 
a changein equilibrium strategies - at least at some profiles - should be due to 
“ofF-the-equilibrium path information” for the solution concept to be able to im­
plement non-dictatorial SCRs. We take a different approach to the question and 
show that some kind of a monotonicity condition pertaining to solution concepts 
- in fact, Maskin monotonicity within a restricted domain of preferences over the 
joint strategies specified by the implementing mechanism - characterize solution 
concepts that only implement monotonie SCRs. In fact, what is done here is to 
introduce a method to transform certain characteristics of a SCR back to corre­
sponding characteristics pertaining to solution concepts that implement it. We 
later use this same method in the last section of the second essay, to characterize 
solution concepts that implement only oligarchic SCRs.
The second part of the thesis is mainly devoted to characterizing oligarchic 
SCRs. Though it is straigthforward to define a dictatorial SCR, there may be 
alternative definitions for an oligarchic SCR. When an oligarchic SCR is thought 
of as “group dictatoriality” - reducing to dictatoriality when the oligarchy con­
sists of a single individual - there may be many acceptable defnitions of an oli­
garchic SCR. We adopt a counterpart of the definition that Guha (1972) uses 
for oligarchic social welfare functions - functions that aggregate every profile of 
individual preferences into a social ordering of the alternatives. We call an SCR 
oligarchic whenever there is a coalition T  of individuals such that the SCR in 
question chooses all the alternatives and only those alternatives which are not 
Pareto dominated by another alternative with respect to the restriction of every 
given profile to T. We characterize such SCRs by unanimity and a condition 
which may be thought of as a form of monotonicity and which we call “oligarchic
monotonicity”. Moreover, we show that for every oligarchic SCR, the coalition 
of agents that form the oligarchy is that minimal coalition for which the SCR is 
Maskin monotonic when the restriction of every profile to this coalition is consid­
ered. Finally, conditions of unanimity and oligarchic monotonicity are modified 
so as to obtain conditions pertaining to solution concepts, using the method in­
troduced in the first part. These latter conditions characterize solution concepts 
that implement only oligarchies.
Chapter 2, below, is devoted to the first essay on “A Characterization of 
Solution Concepts that Implement Only Monotonic Social Choice Rules”. Chap­
ter 2 contains the second essay, “A Characterization of Oligarchic Social Choice 
Rules”. Final chapter contains our concluding remarks.
2 A Characterization of Solution Concepts Which 
Implement Only Monotonie Social Choice Rules
2.1 Introduction
The question dealt with in this paper is a characterization of solution concepts 
which implement only monotonie social choice rules. If one confines himself to 
social choice functions defined on an unrestricted domain of preference profiles 
which take on at least three different values, then one obtains a characterization 
of solution concepts which only implement dictatorial social choice functions as
a corollary to the above characterization in view of Miiller-Satterthwaite (1975) 
Theorem. We know that there is a wide spectrum of solution concepts ranging 
from dominant strategy equilibrium (Gibbard (1973), Satterthwaite (1975)) to 
Nash equilibrium (Dasgupta, Hammond, Maskin (1979)) which falls into this 
category. Thus, it is natural to ask what the common feature of these solution 
concepts exhibiting otherwise very diverse properties is which leads to the same 
set of implemented social choice functions consisting of dictatorialities only.
A finer question in this regard would be to find, for each solution concept, 
the class of mechanisms under which the given solution concepts implement only 
dictatorial social choice functions. An important example which leads to this 
kind of question in a natural fashion is undominated Nash equilibrium. The social 
choice functions on an unrestricted domain of preference profiles which take on at 
least three different values and can be implemented in undominated strategies by 
a bounded mechanism (Jackson (1992) must be dictatorial, while non-dictatorial 
such functions can be implemented in the same equilibrium concept, under non- 
bounded mechanisms.
The question we deal with here was first addressed by Jackson and Srivastava 
(1996). Their point of departure in providing an answer to this question is to 
observe the main difficulty one faces in designing mechanisms that implement a 
prescribed set of social choice rules. In doing so, not only should the mechanism 
guarantee that the desired alternatives are all reached as equilibrium outcomes, 
but it should prevent the undesirable alternatives from occurring as equilibrium 
outcomes as well. Jackson and Srivastava (1996) observe that the necessity to 
satisfy these two objectives simultaneously turns out to require some information
about off the equilibrium path arising under the solution concept considered. 
Focusing their attention on this aspect of the implementation problem, Jackson 
and Srivastava (1996), formulate a condition, named direct breaking, which turns 
out to be equivalent for a solution concept to only implement dictatorial social 
choice functions. This notion which sheds light on an important common feature 
of such solution concepts is, however, not easy to understand, and it has to be 
formulated for pairs of solution concepts and mechanisms, rather than in terms of 
properties of solution concepts only. Thus, the question of whether these solution 
concepts can entirely be described in terms of certain intrinsic properties of theirs 
remains yet to be answered.
The conjecture which we take as our point of departure here is that the mono­
tonicity of the social choice functions in a certain solution concept must be in­
herited from some kind o i ''monotonicity" inherent to the solution concept itself. 
The answer we provide here is a condition, named G-monotonicity of solution 
concepts, which can roughly be summarized as follows: Fixing the joint strat­
egy space, we consider a complete preorder profile as admissible if and only if 
the indifference classes of all players coincide. Restricting ourselves to admissible 
profiles only, we require that if a joint strategy is a solution at some admissible 
profile and one takes another admissible profile according to which the position of 
the said solution is not worsened from the viewpoint of any of the players, then 
there is some joint strategy which is preference-wise equivalent to the original 
solution and is itself a solution at the latter profile. Note that we have here two 
major differences from Maskin-monotonicity. One is that we are only interested 
in what happens at profiles in a restricted domain, namely those which can be 
induced on the joint message space of a mechanism via the outcome function of
the same. Secondly, we do not require that a solution continues to be a solution 
at a new profile obtained from the original one by not worsening its position, but 
we only require that something preference-wise equivalent gets chosen there. This 
kind of monotonicity pertaining to solution concepts turns out to be equivalent 
to the monotonicity of all social choice rules implemented by these.
In section 2, the basic notions are introduced. In section 3, we state and prove 
the main result of the paper. Some examples are considered in section 4, followed 
by concluding remarks in the closing section.
2.2 Preliminaries
N  will stand for a nonempty finite set of agents and M  =  Hieiv  ^nonempty 
joint strategy space which will be kept fixed throughout the paper. We will denote 
by A an alternative set with I elements, where I is a positive integer. Letting TZ 
stand for the set of all complete preorders on M, will denote the set of all 
such profiles. Given a profile ^  in TZ^ , and will stand for the complete
preorder  ^ of i and the strict and indifference parts thereof, respectively, for each 
i E. N. Similarly, we let V denote the set of all linear orders on A and V^, the 
set of such profiles.
We call a function g : M A, which is onto, an outcome function, and denote 
the set of all such functions by A solution concept for a normal form game
with joint ‘strategy space M now is nothing but a function a : 7Z^  —> 2^. The 
complete preorder is a relation which is complete and transitive.
set of all solution concepts will be denoted by S. Finally we will use T  to denote 
the set of all social choice rules F : > 2^.
Having introduced our basic notation, we are now ready to introduce the main 
notions of the paper. We call a complete preorder profile y  in admissible if 
and only if one has m m for all j  G N, whenever m fh for some i  ^ N, 
where m,fh  ^ M. In other words, y  is admissible if and only if all the agents 
have exactly the same indifference classes. Thus, note that every linear order 
profile is admissible. We denote the subset of consisting of the admissible 
profiles by A  and for any >zG A, m,fh e M, we simply write fh whenever 
m ' i^ in for some i E N {ov equivalently for all i E N). Now, each admissible 
profile ^  in induces a partition on M consisting of the (common) indifference 
classes. We will call this partition p(b)·
An outcome function g : M —i A also induces a partition | a: G A} on
M, which we denote by p{g). For each g e Q, set A{g) =  A  | p{y) =  p(^)}· 
In other words, A{g) consists of those admissible profiles on M, whose indifference 
classes coincide with the partition of M induced by g. Now, it is clear that every 
yE A{g) leads to a linear order profile on A in a natural fashion and vice versa. 
Now, let  ^ G G,yE A{g) and P E be given. We say that P is induced 
by y  via g if and only if, for any a,b E A with g{m) =  a,g{fh) = b, where 
m,rh E M, and for any i E N, we have aPib if and only if m in. Here, note 
that if m, m', ih,m' E M are such that g{m) — g{fh) =  a and g{rh) — g{rh') =  6, 
then m yi  in is equivalent to m! y  in' for any i E N, since ^G A{g) and thus 
p{h) =  pip)· Conjoining this with the ontoness of g, it is seen that the above 
notion is a well-defined one. Similarly, we say that y  is induced by P via g if
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and only if, for any m,m E M and z G AT, we have that m fh ii and only if 
g{m)Pig{fh). Obviously, P  is induced by y  via g if and only if y  is induced by 
P  via g. So, for any g E G, there is a one-to-one correspondence between linear 
order profiles on A and the admissible complete preorder profiles y  on M  with 
P(^) =  P{9)·
We are now ready to introduce a particular kind of monotonicity pertaining 
to solution concepts which can be regarded as the central notion of this paper. 
First set A{G) =  U 3eG*^(^) nonempty subset G of G. Let Li{m,y)
stand fo the lower contour set {m! 6 M | m m'} of ^ 6  .4 at m € M 
for i £ N, as usual. Now, given a solution concept a and a nonempty subset 
G of G, we say that a is G-monotonic if and only if, for any y ,  y'^ A{G) with 
p(^) =  ^ there exists some m! G cr{y') with m' ^  m whenever
Li{m,y)  C Li{m,y') for any i E N. We refer to ^-monotonicity as universal 
monotonicity.
Finally, given a social choice rule F E T, a, solution concept a E S and an 
outcome function g E G, wg say that F is a-implementable via g if and only if, 
for every P E one has F{P) =  ^(cr(^)), where y  is the complete preorder 
profile on M  induced by P. F is said to be a-implementable if and only if there 
is some g E G via which F is cr-implementable.
2.3 The Result
T heorem  Let a E S,G C G. Now, a is G-monotonie if and only if every SCR 
which is a-implementable via some g E G is monotonie.
P ro o f Assume that all social choice rules which are cr-implementable via some 
g E G are monotonie. Let y ,  y 'E  A{G) with p(^) =  p{>z'), m E cr(^) and 
assume that Li{m, C Li{m, for each i E N. Since y ,  y 'E  A{G), there is 
an outcome function g E G with p{y)  =  p{y') = p{g)· Define F : 2^,
by F{P") = g{a{y")) for each P" E where y" is induced by P" via g. 
Now, F is well-defined, and being cr-implemenable via g, is monotonie. Now, let 
P,P' be the linear order profiles on A, induced by y , y '  respectively via g. Let 
b E A,i E N he such that g{m)Pib. Let fh E M he such that g{fh) =  b. Then, 
m yi  fh, and hence m y\ fh, which in turn implies g{m)P-b. Therefore, we have 
yb E A,m E N : g{m)Pib g{m)P!b. Then by monotonicity, g{m) E F{P').
Since F is a-implementable via g, there is some fh E cr{y') with g{m) =  g{m), 
which implies m ^ m.
Conversely, assume that a is G-monotonic. Let F : - f  2 ,^ be a social
choice rule which is a-implementable via some g EG.  Let P, P' E , a E F{P) 
be such that yi E N,b E A : {aPib aP'ib). Let y , '^  be induced by P,P'
via g, respectively. Then, obviously, p(^) =  p{y') =  p{g)· Let m E a(^ )  
be such that g{m) =  o. Let i E N,fh E M he such that m fh. Then, 
g{m)Pig{fh), hence g{m)Plg{fh); which implies m y'^  fh. Therefore we have, 
yi E N : Li{m,y)  C Li{m,y'). Then, by G-monotonicity of a, there is some
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fh G (7{h') such that m fh. Then, g{rh) =  g{m) =  o G F{P'). Hence, F is 
monotonie. ■
Using universal monotonicity instead of G-monotonicity, we get the following 
result as a special case of the above theorem:
C orollary 1 A solution concept, a, is universally monotonie if and only if all 
SCRs which are a-implementable are monotonie.
The combination of our theorem and the Miiller-Satterthwaite theorem leads to 
the following corollary:
C orollary 2 Let a £ S, |.A| > 3 .  If a is universally monotonie, then every 
a-implementahle social choice function, F : 2^ \0  is dictatorial.
We now associate a class of outcome functions with each solution concept 
a through = {g E Ç :| g{cr{h)) |=  1 for each ^G ^(</)}· Given a, this is 
the class of all outcome functions via which a  implements only singleton valued 
SCRs. We give below a characterization of solution concepts which implement 
dictatorial ones from among social choice functions which are onto a set consisting 
of at least three elements.
C orollary 3 Let a Ç: S and | |>  3. a is Ga-monotonic if and only if every
a-implementable social choice function is dictatorial.
11
2.4 Examples
E xam ple 1 (undominated strategies solution concept) Let a stand for the un­
dominated strategies solution concept. Let G = {g £ G„ \ a bounded
mechanism}^ Then, a  is G-monotonic. To see this let A{G),m € S{y
), z G AT be such that p(^) =  every j  € N\{ i} ,  y.j=hj  and Li{m, y
) C Li{m,y'). It suffices to show that monotonicity holds for such changes in 
the profile. Obviously, there is some g G G such that p{y) =  p{y’) =  p{g)· Now, 
assume that m ^ crih')· Then, there is some ihi G Mi such that rhi dominates 
rrii and is undominated at h·. Then, G cr(^'). Also, {rhi,m,-i) m
and hence {fhi,m^i) m. If rhi is undominated at then {ihi,m-i) G cr(b), 
and g{fh) =  g{m), since the outcome correspondence is singleton valued. If fhi 
is dominated at then there is some fhi which dominates fhi and is undomi­
nated at Then, {fhi,m-i) G cr(^) -which implies that {fhi,m-i) ~  m; and 
{fhi,m-i) ^i {fhi,m-i). Hence, we have {fhi,m-i) Xj {fhi,Tn-i) ta m. Therefore, 
g{m) = g{{fhi,m-i)); i.e., {fhi,m-i) ~  m.
a  may not be G-monotonic, when G is allowed to contain unbounded mech­
anisms. To see this consider the following unbounded mechanism (Jackson and 
Srivastava (1996)):
mechanism (M,g) is bounded if and only if Vi 6 AT, V e TZ,rrii Ç. Mi : mi is either 
undominated or 3m € M i which dominates mi and is undominated. Note that (M,g) is bounded 
whenever M is finite. Also note that since we have fixed the joint strategy space M, every g 
determines a mechanism
12
rh? ni^ VP? 9 . . .
w } a a a a a a  . . .
w } b b b b b b . . .
ffi^ c b b c c c  . . .
'· a a c c a a  . . .
a a c c c a  . . .
a a c c c c  . . .
Let Pi =  {c,a,by,P{ =  {a,b,c), and P2 =  P2 =  (a,b,c). Let bi>bi be 
the corresponding preference relations on M  induced by P  and P' respectively 
(z =  1,2). Then, p{y)  =  p{h'). Now, 6 cr{h) and g{{fh},ni^)) =  b.
Also note that {m},rn^) improves its position from to for z =  1,2. But, m} 
is the only undominated strategy of agent 1 at P'. Therefore, for any m G 
g{m) =  o, hence not indifferent to
Also, o may not be G-monotonic when G contains a mechanism which does not 
necessarily lead to singleton valued outcomes at every profile, although G contains 
only bounded mechanisms. To see this, consider the following mechanism:
if? rr?
m} a b
rf? c d
®This notation means that agent 1 prefers c to o and o to 6.
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Let Pi =  P{ =  {a,b,c,d),P2 =  {a,b,d,c), and P2 =  (a,b,c,d). Let hi, hi be 
the corresponding preference relations on M induced by P  and P' respectively 
{i =  1,2). Then, p(^) =  p{h')· Now, G but ^ cr(^').
Moreover, there is no other strategy combination which is mapped into b =  
g{{m},m?)) by g. Hence, no equilibrium under h' is indifferent to 
although {m},ni^) improves its position from hi to h'i,{i =  1)2).
E xam ple 2 (Iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies) Let o denote 
the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies solution concept. Assume 
that M is finite. Then, a is G^ r^-monotonic. To see this, let h'^ A{Ga),m G 
<^{h),g S Gc be such that the position of m relative to other joint strategies at 
h', is at least as good as that at ^  for each i e N, and p(^) =  p{h') =  p{9)· 
Suppose m 0  cr{h')· Then, there is a first stage and an agent j  such that ruj is 
strictly dominated at hj, relative to the remaining alternatives. Let ihj be such 
that Mj C Lj{rhj, ru-j, ^). Such an rh exists since M  is finite. Then, {mj, m^j) G 
o'(b), because all components of m-j  survive iterated elimination procedure at 
since m G cr(^). Hence, g{m) = g{{ihj,m-j)) i.e., {jfij,m-j) ~  m. Thus, 
Mj C Lj{m, ^). But then, it is not possible that rrij is strictly dominated at h'j 
relative to the remaining alternatives; a contradiction. It should be noted that 
iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies solution concept satisfies a 
stronger version of monotonicity when coupled with the above specified set of 
outcome functions. Namely, a joint strategy which is an equilibrium at some 
given profile on M should continue to be so at any profile at which its position
14
is no worse relative to other alternatives for any of the agents. G-monotonicity 
would require only that a joint strategy, which is preference-wise equivalent to 
the initial equilibrium should be an equilibrium at the latter profile.
Iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies solution concept may 
not be G-monotonic, when G is allowed to contain outcome functions which a- 
implement non singleton valued SCRs . To see this, the mechanism in the second 
example above will be useful. This time let P\ =  P[ =  (a, c, d, 6), P2 =  (c, d, ft, o), 
and Pj =  {d,c,b,a). Let hi, hi be the corresponding preference relations on 
M  induced by P  and P' respectively (i= l,2 ). Then, p{h) = p{h')· Now, 
{m},rri )^ G cr(^), but ^ cr{h')· Moreover, there is no other strategy
combination which is mapped into a = g{{m^,rfp)) by g. Hence, no equilibrium 
under h' is indifferent to although {w},fn^) improves its position from
hi to h'i, for ¿ =  1,2.
E xam ple 3 (Nash and strong Nash solution concepts) It is easy to see that both 
Nash and strong Nash solution concepts are universally monotonic.
E xam ple 4 (Undominated Nash solution concept) The following example from 
Jackson and Srivastava (1996) shows that undominated Nash solution concept is 
not universally monotonic, nor G<^-monotonic where cr stands for the undominated 
Nash solution concept. The following is the tabular representation of a mechanism 
g which leads to a single valued outcome correspondence:
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rr? - 2
m} a a
m b c
Let Pi =  P{ = {c,a,b),P2 = (a,b,c), and Pj =  (a,c,b). Let t .i ,hi  be 
the corresponding preference relations on M induced by P and P' respectively 
(i =  1,2). Then, p{y)  =  p{h'). Now, € cr(^), but ^
Neither is {m ,^fh?). But, {vn},m^) improves its position from to for
¿ =  1, 2.
E xam ple 5 (Maximin strategies solution concept) Letting a denote the max- 
imin strategies solution concept the following example from Jackson and Srivas­
tava (1996) shows that maximin strategies solution concept is not universally 
monotonie, nor G<r-monotonic. Consider the following outcome function g:
m2 fh^ m2
m} a a b
a c c
b c c
Let Pi =  P[ =  {a,c,b),P2 =  (a,b,c), and Pg =  (o, c, 6). Let hi, hi be the 
corresponding preference relations on M induced by P and P' respectively (i= l,2). 
Then, p(^) =  p{h')· Now, (m^,m^) G cr(^). Also, {m},Tri )^ improves its position 
from hi to hi, for ¿ =  1,2. Maximin strategies equilibrium at h' is But,
g{fh'-,fh )^ — ci^a = g{m},Tri )^, i.e., {m},rri )^ '/'i (m^,m^), ¿ =  1,2.
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2.5 Conclusion
The straightforwardness of the proof of our main theorem here is indicative of the 
directness of the inheritence of monotonicity of social choice rules implemented in 
an equilibrium concept from the monotonicity of that equilibrium concept itself. 
Moreover, the difference of G-monotonicity, pertaining to solution concepts from 
regular monotonicity are accounted for by the very structure of the institutions - 
namely, mechanisms - through which the implementation takes place. Note that 
our main theorem not only characterizes solution concepts which only implement 
monotonie social choice rules, but it also provides a criterion which allows us, 
for any given solution concept, to partition the class of mechanisms into two 
subclasses, where one subclass consists of those mechanisms through which only 
monotonie social choice rules are implemented and, for each member of the other 
class, there is at least one nonmonotonic social choice rule which is implemented 
via that mechanism.
It should also be noted that universal monotonicity of a solution concept 
is sufficient, but may not be necessary for all social choice functions which are 
onto an alternative space consisting of at least three members and are imple- 
mentable according to that solution concept to be dictatorial. Given a solution 
concept (7 , letting G stand for the set of all outcome functions g defined on a 
joint message space M for which g{a{y)) consists of exactly one member for each 
complete preorder profile ^  on M with p{y) =  p{g), it is G-monotonicity of a 
which is equivalent to the dictatoriality of all social choice functions which are 
(j-implementable and take on at least three different values.
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The problem adressed here can also be thought of as a particular instance 
of what one would call the inverse problem of implementability. In other words, 
instead of starting with given solution concepts and asking what social choice 
rules are implementable in these, here we start with a class of social choice rules 
(namely, the monotonie ones) and ask what solution concepts implement only 
social choice rules within the given class. In fact, refining this question a bit 
further, for any given solution concept, we also ask what the class of mechanisms 
through which this solution concept implements only social choice rules belonging 
to the prescribed set is. The solution concept can be regarded as representing the 
behavioral mode prevailing in the society, while the prescribed set of social choice 
rules may be reflecting what is desirable by the society. Under this interpreta­
tion, the determination of mechanisms under which the given solution concept 
implements prescribed social choice rules only amounts to solving an institutional 
design problem for this society to guarantee the achievement of desirable results. 
This framework covers, of course, a very broad spectrum of problems many of 
which are yet to be posed and solved.
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3 A Characterization of Oligarchic Social Choice 
Rules
3.1 Introduction
The well-known impossibility result of Arrow (1963) states that a rule which ag­
gregates individual preference relations over an alternative set with at least three 
elements into a social welfare ordering has to be dictatorial whenever the social 
welfare ordering is to be complete and transitive, the domain of individual pref­
erences contains the class of all linear orders and the aggregation rule satisfies 
independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) and unanimity. Many studies look 
at different ways to weaken the conditions that lead to dictatoriality so that it 
might be avoided. The most popular path to follow for this purpose has been 
restricting the domain of individual preference relations. Guha (1972) follows 
a different approach to this problem and rather than restricting the individual 
preferences he drops the requirement that the social welfare ordering should be 
transitive and complete. He instead requires only that the social welfare ordering 
should be quasi-transitive. He shows that when Arrow’s requirement of transi­
tivity is weakened into quasi-transitivity, there are non-dictatorial aggregation 
rules - namely, oligarchic ones - which aggregate individual linear orders over an 
alternative set with at least three elements and which satisfies HA and unanimity. 
The aggregation rules Guha calls oligarchic are those for which there is a coalition 
T  of agents such that one alternative a is socially preferred to another alternative 
b if and only if agents in T unanimously prefer a to b.
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Each aggregation rule induces a social choice rule - a function which takes 
every preference profile for the agent set to a subset of the alternative set - in a 
natural manner. Given a preference profile, the social choice rule thus induced 
chooses the set of maximizers of the social welfare ordering determined by the ag­
gregation rule. The Gibbard (1973) - Satterthwaite (1975) theorem - which states 
that every social choice rule choosing a single outcome at every profile from an 
alternative set with cardinality at least three is strategy-proof if and only if it is 
dictatorial - carries the impossibility result of Arrow to the class of social choice 
rules. Later, it is shown by Müller and Satterthwaite that strategy-proofness is 
equivalent to monotonicity’ which implies that every social choice function which 
is monotonic has to be dictatorial. What we do in what follows is in some sense 
the counterpart for the class of social choice rules of what Guha has done for the 
aggregation rules. We define the oligachic social choice rules as those for which 
there is a subset of the agents such that the social choice rule chooses all the 
alternatives and only those alternatives which are not Pareto dominated by an­
other with respect to the restriction of the given preference profile to this subset of 
agents. We relax the requirement that the social choice rule should choose a single 
alternative for each given preference profile. We, then, introduce a monotonicity 
condition which is stronger than the Maskin monotonicity and which character­
izes oligarchic social choice rules when coupled with the condition of unanimity. 
Furthermore, we identify the “oligarchy” as the minimal coalition such that the 
social choice rule in question is Maskin monotonic when the restriction of each 
profile to this coalition is considered.
The basic notions are introduced in Section 2, the main result is presented in 
Section 3. Section 4 takes a brief look at issues concerning implementability of
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oligarchic social choice rules and some concluding remarks are given in Section 4.
3.2 Preliminaries
N  will stand for a nonempty finite set of agent and A will stand for an alterative 
set, which is also nonempty and finite. By V  we will denote the set of all linear 
orders on A, and by V^, the set of all preference profiles on A, each component 
of which come from V. A typical profile in will be denoted by P  and Pi will 
stand for the individual ordering of agent i as part of the profile P, for every 
i E N. By aPib we will mean that agent i prefers a to ¿> at profile P. A social 
choice rule (SCR), now, is a function F : —>· 2'^\{0}; ie, it is a function which
maps every linear order profile on A into a nonempty subset of it.
Having introduced the notation, we can now proceed to basic definitions. 
Maskin monotonicity is defined in the usual manner; i.e., letting L,(P, o) stand 
for the lower contour set {b E A \ aPib} of P  G at a E A, for i E N, an 
SCR is said to be (Maskin) monotonic if and only if for every P, P' E and 
a E F{P) if for each i E N  one has Li{P, a) C Pj(P', a), then it must be the case 
that a E F(P '). An SCR F satisfies unanimity if and only if for each P  € P^and 
for each a E A, one has F (P ) =  {a} whenever A C Li(P,a) for every i E N. 
We will say that an SCR F is Pareto optimal if and only if for all P  E and 
for all a E P (P ), a is Pareto optimal with respect to P . Moreover, we will say 
that an SCR F is oligarchic with T  for some coalition T C iV if and only if for 
every P  E F{P) = {a E A \ $b E A \{a} such that bPia for every i G T}.
22
To define the monotonicity condition that we introduce in this paper which we 
will call “oligarchic monotonicity”, first let N{a,b; P) stand for the set of agents 
who prefer a to 6 at profile Ffor every a,b ^ A and P  G . An SCR F is said 
to satisfy oligarchic monotonicity if and only if for every P  G and for every 
a ^ F{P), there exists some alternative b G F(P) such that if for every P' G 
N{a,b-,P') C N{a,b]P), then one has a ^ F(P'). Finally, given any coalition 
T C N, we will say that an SCR F is T-monotonic if and only if F is monotonic 
when the restriction of every profile to the coalition T is considerd; i.e., for all 
P, P' G and a G F(P), if Li{P, a) C Li{P\ a) for every i G T, then a G F(P').
3.3 The Result
Before stating our main theorem, it should be made clear that oligarchic mono­
tonicity implies monotonicity. To see this, first consider an alternative definition 
of monotonicity: an SCR is monotonic if and only if for every P, P' G and 
a G F{P')\F(P),  there exists an alternative b G Li{P', o )\{o} and an agent i E N  
such that bPia; i.e., if a is not chosen at P, then for any profile P', where a is 
chosen, there must be an agent whose preference concerning a and some other 
alternative - which might be different for each such profile - has been changed in 
favor of a.
Our condition oligarchic monotonicity requires that this other alternative 
should be from the choice set of F  at P  and the same alternative should work 
for every profile where F chooses a. One more point to be made, which follows
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from this observation is that since the conjunction of monotonicity and unanim­
ity implies Pareto optimality for an SCR, so does the conjunction of oligarchic 
monotonicity and unanimity.
Now we are ready to state and prove our main result:
T heorem  Let F : 2^\{0} be an SCR. F is oligarchic with T* for some
T* C N if and only if F satisties oligarchic monotonicity and unanimity.
P ro o f Let F be an SCR and assume that F satisfies oligarchic monotonicity 
and unanimity. Let a,b E A and T C N. First it should be made clear that the 
followings are equivalent:
(I) \JPe V^ ■. N{a, b ] P ) = T  implies b ^ F{P)
(II) 3 P e V ^  : N{a, b ] P ) = T  and F{P) =  {o}.
Now, (II) directly implies (I) by oligarchic monotonicity. For the converse, assume 
(I) and consider a profile P  such that Vi E T : aPib, Vi E N \T  : bPia and Vi E 
NVc E A \{a , b} : aPiC and bPiC. Now, since F  is Pareto optimal and b 0  F{P)  
by (I), one has {o} =  F{P).  Therefore, (II) is satisfied.
Now, for each a,b E A set B{a,b) =  {5  C iV | (I) or -eqivalently - (II) is 
satisfied for a, b and S'}. Consider the following profiles P  and P':
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Now, b ^ F{P) by (I) and c ^ F{P)  by Pareto optimality. Hence, {a} =  F{P). 
This implies, by (II), that T e B{a,c). Similarly b ^ F{P') by (I) and a ^ F(P') 
by Pareto Optimality. Thus {c} =  F{P'). Hence, by (II), T  € B{c,b). There­
fore, for all T c N, if T E B{a,b) for a pair a,b, then for every pair x,y  ^ A, 
T G B{x,y).  Set B =  U(a,6)€>ix>i F{a,b). Let T,T' C B and consider the follow­
ing profile P:
TOT' T \T ' T '\T N \T  U r
a C b c
b a C b
c b a a
Now, b ^ F{P) because N{a, b;P) =  T and c ^ F{P)  because N{b, c; P) = T'. 
Therefore, {o} =  F{P).  Moreover, T D T' =  N{a, c; P ), hence T C\T' € B. Set 
T* =  HreB Obviously, T* G B. We will now show that F is oligarchic with T*. 
For this, let P  G and let a ^ {a; G A | ^ 6  G -<4\{a:} such that T* C iV(6, x; P)}.
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Then, there exists some alternative b such that T* C iV(6 , a;P ). Since F is also 
monotonic, we have a ^ F{P), because otherwise it is possible to construct a 
profiel P' such that N{b,a-,P') =  T* and a € F (F '). Conversely, let a 0  F(P). 
Then, by oligarchic monotonicity there is some b € F{P) such that for every 
P e a ^ F(P'), whenever N(b, a; P) C N{b, a; P'). But then N{b, a; P) 6  B, 
hence T* C N{b, a; P); i.e., a ^ {x G A \$ b  e  such that T* C N{b, x; P)}.
Therefore, F is oligarchic with T*.
For the converse, assume that F is oligarchic with some T* C N. Then, 
obviously F is unanimous. To check oligarchic monotonicity, let a ^ F{P) 
for some P  € and some a G A. Then, since Pareto domination defines a 
transitive relation on A and since A is finite, there exists some b € P (P ) such 
that T* C N{b,a]P). But then, if P' e  is such that a G F(P'), we have 
T* (fi N{b,a-,P'), which in turn implies that N{b,a]P) (f. N{b,a-,P'), hence 
N{a,b]P') <t AT(a,6;P ). ■
It should be noted that the oligarchy in question could very well be the whole 
agent set, and in that case the SCR will be the Pareto optimality rule. When the 
oligarchy is a proper subset of the agent set, the agents outside the oligarchy have 
absolutely no say on the determination of the choice set; i.e., the SCR in question 
is constant in the individual preferences of the agents outside the oligarchy. Given 
an oligarchic SCR, it could be of interest to determine the colaition that acts as 
the oligarchy. We below propose a way to do this.
R em ark For any SCR P , if F is T-monotonic for some T C N, then for any
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S C N  with T C S, F IS 5-monotonic.
Moreover, if F is unanimous and T — and 5 — monotonic, then T D 5  ^  0. To 
see this let T and 5  be two such coalitions and suppose that T n 5  =  0. Now 
consider a profile P  such that a is the top choice for every agent in T and b is the 
second; and for every agent in 5, the converse is true. If a 6  F{P), then a should 
be chosen when it is the second choice and b is the top coice for everybody since 
F is 5-monotonic, which leads to a contradiction. Similarly, b ^ F{P); and since 
there are no other candidates which are not Pareto dominated at the restriction 
of P to 5  U T, we reach a contradiction. It is also easy to observe that for any 5  
and T as above, F is T n 5-monotonic.
To proceed to our proposition concerning the identity of the oligarchy, we first 
need to introduce another piece of notation. With each unanimous and monotonic 
SCR F, we will associate a coalition M{F) C N, which is the minimal coalition 
for which F is monotonic; i.e., M{F) = n { T  € 2 ^ \{0} | F is T-monotonic}.
Obviously, if an SCR F is oligarchic with oligarchy T, for some T C N, F is 
T-monotonic. Therefore, for any oligarchic SCR F, the oligarchy contains M{F). 
The following proposition states that M{F) is in fact equal to the oligarchy.
P rop osition  If F is oligachic with some T C N, then T  =  M{F).
P ro o f M{F) C T by above observation. Suppose T\M {F) 7  ^ 0, and consider a 
profile P  such that a is the top and b is the second in the preference orderings of 
each agent in M{F), and for each agent in T\M {F) a is the second and b is the
27
top. Therefore, F{P) =  {a, 6}. But now, since F is M(F)-monotonic, b e  F{P') 
for any profile P' such that a is the top and b is the second choice of every agent 
in T; a contradiction. Therefore, T =  M{F). ■
Finally, the combination of the theorem and the proposition above lead to the 
following obvious corollary:
C orollary F satisfies oligarchic monotonicity and is unanimous if and only if F 
is oligarchic with oligarchy M(F).
3.4 A Note on Implementability of Oligarchies
Having characterized the oligarchic social choice rules, we now wish to look at the 
game theoretic solution concepts which implement oligarchies. In fact, we come 
up with a characterization of solution concepts which only implement oligarchies. 
In doing this, we will make use of similar concepts to those that we used in 
characterizing solution concepts which implement only monotonie SCRs (Kaya 
and Koray, 1999). What we will do is to specify properties pertaining to solution 
concepts such that an SCR implemented by a solution concept having those 
properties is unanimous and satisfies oligarchic monotonicity. To do this, we 
need to introduce some further notions and notation:
M =  riieiv stand for a nonempty joint strategy space which will be
kept fixed throughout. Letting TZ stand for the set of all complete preorders on 
M, TZ^  will denote the set of all such profiles. Given a profile y  in
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and ~ i will stand for the complete preorder of i and the strict and indifference 
parts thereof, respectively, for each i £ N.
We call a function g : M A, which is onto, an outcome function, and denote 
the set of all such functions by A solution concept for a normal form game 
with joint strategy space M  now is nothing but a function a : —>· 2^. The
set of all solution concepts will be denoted by S. Finally we will use T  to denote 
the set of all social choice rules F : 2^.
We call a complete preorder profile ^  in TZ^  admissible if and only if one has 
m m for all j  G N, whenever m fh for some i G N, where m,fh G M. In 
other words, ^  is admissible if and only if all the agents have exactly the same 
indifference classes. Thus, note that every linear order profile is admissible. We 
denote the subset of TZ^  consisting of the admissible profiles by A  and for any 
m ,m  G M, we simply write m ^  in whenever m >^ifh for some i G N  
(or equivalently for all i G N). Now, each admissible profile ^ in .4 induces a 
partition on M consisting of the (common) indifference classes. We will call this 
partition p(h)·
An outcome function g : M A also induces a partition {^“ (^a;) | a: G A} on 
M, which we denote by p{g). For each g e Q, set A{g) =  A. | p{y) = p{g)}. 
In other words, A{g) consists of those admissible profiles on M, the collection of 
whose indifference classes coincide with the partition of M  induced by g. Now, it 
is clear that every ^G A{g) leads to a linear order profile on A in a natural fashion 
and vice versa. Now, let g g Q, A{g) and P g V be given. We say that P is 
induced by ^  via g if and only if, for any a,b G A with g{m) =  a, g{fh) =  b, where
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m, m E M, and for any г € İV, we have aPib if and only if m fh. Here, note 
that if m, m', fh,fh' E M  are such that g{m) =  g{fh) =  a and g{fh) =  g{fh!) =  b, 
then m Уi in is equivalent to m' У in' for any г E N, since A{g) and thus 
p{y) = Pİo)· Conjoining this with the ontoness of g, it is seen that the above 
notion is a well-defined one. Similarly, we say that У is induced by P via g if 
and only if, for any m,fh E M  and г G iV, we have that m Уi in if and only if 
g{m)Pig{rh). Obviously, P  is induced by У via g if and only if У is induced by 
P  via g. So, for any g E Ç, there is a one-to-one correspondence between linear 
order profiles on A and the admissible complete preorder profiles ^  on M with
p { t)= p { g )·
Given G C we will call a solution concept a G—unanimous if and only if for 
every У Е  A{G) and for every m E M: cr(^) c  p{m, b ) whenever Ve G N^m' G 
M : m Уг m'. Moreover, a solution concept will be said to satisfy oligarchic 
monotonicity in G, if and only if for every У Е  A{G) and for every m G M  : if 
p{y) П cr{y) =  0, then there is an equilibrium joint strategy m' E  cr(^) such 
that for every profile У '  inducing the same partition on M  as does У ,  one has 
р {щ  h )  П cr{y') — 0, whenever N{m', m; У)  C N{m', m;
Finally, given a social choice rule F E T, a, solution concept a E S and an 
outcome function g E 0, we say that F is a-implementable via g iff, for every 
P E , one has F{P) =  д{сг{У)), where У  is the complete preorder profile on 
M  induced by P. F is said to be a-implementable iff there is some g E Ç via. 
which F is a-implementable.
Having introduced the notions we will use to characterize the solution con­
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cepts that only implement oligarchies, we can now state the following proposition 
the proof of which is almost obvious and is very similar to the proof of the main 
theorem in Kaya and Koray (1999) and which therefore will be omitted:
P rop osition  Let G G Q. A solution concept a is G-unanimous and satisfies 
oligarchic monotonicity in G if and only if every SCR which is a-implementable 
is oligarchic.
3.5 Conclusion
Dictatorial social choice rules which involve absolute concentration of power in 
the hands of a single individual have been characterized by Müller and Satterth- 
waite (1972) as those which are Maskin monotonie, onto and singleton valued 
over a range of at least three alternatives. What we have done is to characterize 
the class of social choice rules where a group of individuals rather than a single 
individual holds absolute power over the society’s choice. We define olgarchic 
social choice rules as those for which there is a coalition T  such that given a 
preference profile P, the social choice rule in question chooses all the alternatives 
and only those alternatives which are Pareto optimal relative to the restriction of 
P  to T. This definition has dictatorial social choice functions as a special case, 
when |T| =  1 . Our characterization of oligarchies as we here define involve una­
nimity coupled with oligarchic monotonicity, which is stronger than the Maskin 
monotonicity which characterizes dictatorial social choice functions. We relax the 
assumption of singleton valuedness so that our stronger version of monotonicity
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does not necessarily lead to dictatoriality. Another thing we accomplish is -given 
an oligarchic social choice rule - to identify the oligarchy as the minimal coalition 
T  such that the social choice rule is T-montonic.
We also look at the implementability of oligarchies and adopt the method 
- which we used when characterizing the solution concepts that implement only 
monotonie social choice rules (Kaya and Koray, 1999) - of translating properties of 
social choice rules into properties pertaining to solution concepts that implement 
them. In this manner, we specify the properties of the solution concepts which 
are inherited by the implemented social choice rules as unanimity and oligarchic 
monotonicity.
There might be other ways to generalize an individual’s dictatoriality into 
a “coalition’s rule”, so that the latter has dictatoriality as a special case. One 
such way to define an oligarchy is to call a social choice rule oligarchic whenever 
there is a group of individuals such that at every preference profile, the set of 
alternatives chosen consists of the top choices of individuals in the said group. 
Yet another definition could call a social choice rule oligarchic if there is a coalition 
T such that an alternative is chosen whenever individuals in T  unanimously prefer 
this alternative to all other alternatives. Moreover, any refinement of the social 
choice rules defined above, including the definition that we have adopted, would 
serve the purpose in the sense of reducing to dictatoriality for singleton oligarchy 
and defining instances where power is - in some sense - concentrated within a 
coalition. However, the latter definition and the above-mentioned refinements 
are difficult to handle, because they do not completely determine what is to be 
chosen at each profile and hence typically involve ceises where individuals outside
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the oligarchy have some power over the society’s decision. Having characterized 
only one version of what one may call an oligarchic social choice rule, we believe 
that a classification and characterization of such generalizations of dictatoriality 
to oligarchy could be of interest for further research.
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4 Conclusion
In the two essays of which the thesis consists, we have accomplished mainly two 
things;
Firstly, we introduced a method to transform conditions that an SCR may 
satisfy into conditions that may be satisfied by solution concepts. This method 
allowed us to specify the class of solution concepts that implement only those 
SCRs that satisfy the condition that we started with. To put differently, we, in 
a sense, asked some “inverse” implementability questions and provided answers 
using the method introduced in the first essay. The most common questions that 
have been taken up in the literature on implementation are those that seek to 
characterize the class of SCRs that a specific solution concept may implement, 
our questions have been inverse to such ones in the sense of first specifying the 
class of SCRs to be implemented - namely, monotonie and oligarchic SCRs - and 
then trying to speify the exact set of solution concepts such that the class of 
SCRs that may be implemented via these solution concepts fall into the class 
that we initially started with. Our method of answering such questions reflect 
and support our view that implemented SCRs inherit characteristics from the 
solution concepts that implement them.
Second thing we accomplished is a characterization of oligarchic SCRs. It has 
been of interest to us to classify SCRs according to their “degree of anonimity”, 
with dictatorialities at the one end and anonymous SCRs at the other end of the 
spectrum. If one starts with dictatorialities, oligarchies are the natural second
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step to be considered on this spectrum. Defining oligarchic SCRs in one of many 
possible ways so that the SCR in question reduces to dictatoriality when the 
oligarchy is a singleton, we have shown that oligarchic SCRs are characterized by 
a monotonicity condition coupled with unanimity.
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